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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 08-4906 
_____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
JENNIFER MCDADE, 
Appellant                                      
_____________ 
 
Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Criminal No. 3-06-cr-00029-007) 
District Judge: Honorable Kim R. Gibson 
_____________                         
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
December 13, 2010 
 
Before:  RENDELL, JORDAN and HARDIMAN, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion Filed:  December 22, 2010)                        
_____________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT                         
_____________ 
 
RENDELL, Circuit Judge. 
Appellant Jennifer McDade appeals the District Court’s orders granting the 
government’s motion to disqualify her counsel and refusing to give the 
Appellant’s proposed jury instruction.  We will affirm. 
 Because we write solely for the benefit of the parties who are familiar with 
the factual context and procedural history of this case, we will recite only the facts 
relevant to our analysis.  Consesor Cheatham, a/k/a “Skinny,” developed a drug 
distribution network in Johnstown, PA.  Jennifer McDade traveled between 
Johnstown and Allentown to retrieve the drugs for Consesor.  Consesor would stay 
at McDade’s house while McDade was away getting the drugs and Consesor kept 
some of his drugs buried in McDade’s backyard.  McDade observed Consesor 
cook up cocaine in her kitchen, obtained heroin for Consesor, and helped Consesor 
bag marijuana that McDade then sold.  
 Consesor sold crack and cocaine to some of his customers – including to 
the government witness, Jeremy Johnson – at McDade’s house.  Johnson 
purchased drugs from Consesor at McDade’s house at least seven or eight times.  
Normally, Johnson purchased the drugs on McDade’s porch; however, on one 
occasion, Johnson entered McDade’s house in order to exchange a gun for drugs.  
During the exchange, the gun went off accidentally.  
On October 17, 2006, an indictment charged McDade and co-conspirators 
with conspiracy to distribute and possess fifty grams or more of crack and five 
hundred grams or more of cocaine.  On October 27, 2006, the court appointed 
Attorney Arthur T. McQuillan to represent McDade.  On January 30, 2008, the 
government moved to disqualify McDade’s counsel after learning that 
McQuillan’s law partner, Robert Gleason, had previously represented Johnson.  
On February 1, 2008, the District Court granted the government’s motion to 
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disqualify.  Subsequently, the Court denied McDade’s motion to reconsider after 
holding a hearing regarding the disqualification.  During the hearing, when asked 
whether Johnson waived the conflict, Attorney Gleason stated that “he got the 
impression that it wasn’t much of a concern to [the government witness] unless it 
hurt him.”  Gleason also testified that he did not believe that his continuing duty of 
loyalty to a former client lasted forever.  The District Court then appointed 
attorney David Chontos as McDade’s new counsel. 
 At trial, McDade presented evidence that her home had been foreclosed 
upon and that her car had been repossessed.  Based on that, she requested a jury 
instruction providing that her lack of wealth could be circumstantial evidence that 
she was not involved in criminal activity.  The District Court denied the request. 
Following trial, the jury convicted McDade on June 13, 2008, and the Court 
subsequently denied McDade’s Motion for a New Trial.  On December 9, 2008, 
the District Court sentenced McDade, and she filed a timely Notice of Appeal on 
December 18, 2008. 1 
Discussion 
I.  Disqualification 
McDade asserts that the disqualification of her appointed attorney violated 
her Sixth Amendment right to counsel.  She maintains that the District Court’s 
decision was arbitrary because Johnson – the government’s witness – whose 
                                                 
1 The District Court had jurisdiction over this criminal case by virtue of 18 
U.S.C. § 3231.  This Court has appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
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testimony gave rise to the potential conflict of interest, never testified at the 
disqualification hearing.  McDade argues the District Court did not thoroughly 
investigate (1) whether Johnson’s testimony would indeed lead to a conflict of 
interest or (2) whether Johnson would waive the conflict.2  We disagree.   
Pennsylvania Model Rule of Professional Conduct (“MRPC”) 1.7 states 
that “a lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation involves a 
concurrent conflict of interest.  A concurrent conflict of interest exists if: . . . (2) 
there is significant risk that the representation of one or more clients will be 
materially limited by the lawyer’s responsibilities to another client [or] a former 
client . . . .”3  Id.  Notwithstanding the conflict of interest, a lawyer may continue 
                                                 
2 We review the District Court’s ruling on a motion to disqualify defense 
counsel in two parts.  “First, [this Court will] exercise plenary review to determine 
whether the district court’s disqualification was arbitrary – ‘the product of a failure 
to balance proper considerations of judicial administration against the right to 
counsel.’  If we find that the district court’s decision was not arbitrary, we then 
determine whether the court abused its discretion in disqualifying the attorneys.”  
United States v. Stewart, 185 F.3d 112, 120 (3d Cir. 1996) (citation omitted). 
 
3 The Sixth Amendment guarantee of effective assistance of counsel 
encompasses “the right of adequate representation by an attorney of reasonable 
competence and the right to the attorney’s undivided loyalty free of conflict of 
interest.”  United States v. Gambino, 864 F.2d 1064, 1069 (3d Cir. 1988) (internal 
citations omitted).  However, this guarantee is not absolute given that the purpose 
of the Sixth Amendment right to assistance of counsel “‘is simply to ensure that 
criminal defendants receive a fair trial,’ and that in evaluating Sixth Amendment 
claims, ‘the appropriate inquiry focuses on the adversarial process, not on the 
accused’s relationship with his lawyer as such.’”  Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 
153, 159 (1988) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).  The Supreme 
Court noted that one way in which this right is limited is that “a defendant 
[cannot] insist on the counsel of an attorney who has a previous or ongoing 
relationship with an opposing party, even when the opposing party is the 
Government.”  Id.  
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the representation if “each affected client gives informed consent.”  Id.  
Concurrently, Rule 1.10 imputes one attorney’s conflicts to all other attorneys in 
his firm.  
 Despite the ability of affected clients to waive a concurrent conflict of 
interest, the Supreme Court has stated that a trial court “[has] an independent 
interest in ensuring that criminal trials are conducted within the ethical standards 
of the profession and that legal proceedings appear fair to all who observe them.” 
Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 160 (1988).  Because of this independent 
interest, district courts “must be allowed substantial latitude in refusing waivers of 
conflicts of interest” in both instances where actual or potential conflicts exist.  Id. 
at 163.  Expounding on this topic, we stated, 
Usually, the various rights and duties of the attorney clash when a 
defendant seeks to waive his right to conflict-free representation in 
circumstances in which the counsel of his choice may have divided 
loyalties due to concurrent or prior representation of . . . a 
government witness.  Such a waiver, however, does not necessarily 
resolve the matter, for the trial court has an institutional interest in 
protecting the truth-seeking function of the proceedings over which 
it is presiding by considering whether the defendant has effective 
assistance of counsel, regardless of any proffered waiver.  Moreover, 
to protect the critically important candor that must exist between 
client and attorney, and to engender respect for the court in general, 
the trial court may enforce the ethical rules governing the legal 
profession with respect both to client-attorney communications and 
to conflict-free representation, again regardless of any purported 
waiver.  Finally, the court has an independent interest in protecting a 
fairly-rendered verdict from trial tactics that may be designed to 
generate issues on appeal.  
 
United States v. Moscony, 927 F.2d 742, 749 (3d Cir. 1991). Pursuant to this 
reasoning, “[a]s long as the court makes a ‘reasoned determination on the basis of 
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a fully prepared record,’” the decision to disqualify counsel is not arbitrary. United 
States v. Voight, 89 F.3d 1050, 1075 (3d Cir. 1996) (citation omitted).  
Regardless of McDade’s assertion that the District Court had no way of 
knowing the content of the government witness’s testimony, we find that the 
disqualification was not arbitrary. There was an exchange of pleadings, an 
affidavit produced by the law partner, a disqualification hearing, and ultimately 
two opinions written, one addressing the initial Motion to Disqualify and the other 
following the defendant’s Motion to Reconsider.  Defendant cites no case in which 
a court required a government witness to testify in order to determine whether a 
potential conflict of interest existed.  Indeed, the Supreme Court stated in Wheat, 
[A] district court must pass on the issue whether or not to allow a 
waiver of a conflict of interest by a criminal defendant not with the 
wisdom of hindsight after the trial has taken place, but in the murkier 
pretrial context when relationships between parties are seen through 
a glass, darkly.  The likelihood and dimensions of nascent conflicts 
of interest are notoriously hard to predict, even for those thoroughly 
familiar with criminal trials.  It is a rare attorney who will be 
fortunate enough to learn the entire truth from his own client, much 
less be fully apprised before trial of what each of the Government’s 
witnesses will say on the stand. 
 
486 U.S. at 162-63.  Moreover, Attorney Gleason’s testimony reveals that Johnson 
did not readily waive a potential conflict when he indicated his concern that a 
waiver could hurt him.  (A-93.)   Finally, Gleason’s lack of appreciation for his 
ongoing and permanent duty of loyalty to former clients further supports the 
District Court’s rational resolution.  (A-95.) 
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 Even if both affected parties waived the conflict, the district court still has 
discretion to disregard those waivers given its independent interest in ensuring that 
the proceedings are fair.  Moscony, 927 F.2d at 749.  After extensive development 
of the record, it was far from clear that there had been an effective waiver of the 
conflict affecting McDade’s counsel.  Accordingly, the District Court properly 
balanced “considerations of judicial administration against the right to counsel,” 
Stewart, 185 F.3d at 120, and did not abuse its discretion in disqualifying 
McDade’s appointed counsel.4 
II.  Jury Instruction 
McDade argues that the District Court abused its discretion by not giving 
McDade’s proposed jury instruction that “the defendant’s lack of wealth can be 
circumstantial evidence that there is no involvement in illegal activity.”  She 
asserts that the instruction was an adequate statement of the law, the instruction 
was not substantially covered by other parts of the court’s instruction, and the lack 
of instruction was prejudicial.5  We disagree. 
                                                 
4 McDade also asserts that the District Court should not have considered the 
Motion to Disqualify because the government, and not one of the affected parties, 
raised the issue.  However, McDade concedes that this court has previously 
considered Motions to Disqualify not raised by one of the affected parties.  See 
United States v. Stewart, 185 F.3d 112, 120 (3d Cir. 1996) (citation omitted).  In 
this case, the District Court reserved its ruling on the Motion to Reconsider until 
after hearing testimony that both 1) Johnson was concerned that a waiver might 
hurt him and 2) Attorney Gleason apparently did not understand his duty of 
loyalty to former clients lasted forever.  (A-93-95.) 
 
5 “[This Court] exercise[s] plenary review to determine whether jury 
instructions misstated the applicable law, but in the absence of a misstatement we 
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“The district court has wide discretion in charging the jury.  We will find 
that the court erred in refusing to give an instruction only if the instruction was 
correct, not substantially covered by other instructions, and was so important that 
the omission of the instruction prejudiced the defendant.” United States v. Smith, 
789 F.2d 196, 204 (3d Cir. 1986); United States v. Davis, 183 F.3d 231, 250 (3d 
Cir. 1999) (same).  The District Court determined that the instruction was not 
necessarily correct given that “[a]lthough an unexplained acquisition of wealth 
establishes the receipt of income through some unknown source, the lack of 
wealth can be explained not only by a lack of income, but also by an unwise use of 
that income.”6  (A-22 n.1.)  Additionally, the Court determined that the lack of this 
instruction did not prejudice McDade because it had given the general 
circumstantial evidence instruction.  (Id.)  The Court’s circumstantial evidence 
instruction adequately informed the jury concerning their ability to determine that 
McDade was not guilty because she had arguably not received any monetary fruits 
from the drug conspiracy.  Moreover, neither party cites any case law in this 
Circuit that addresses the propriety of giving this instruction.  Accordingly, we 
                                                                                                                                                 
review for an abuse of discretion.”  United States v. Hoffecker, 530 F.3d 137, 173-
74 (3d Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). 
 
6 Indeed, McDade requested that the district court give the inverse of the 
common jury charge that “the sudden unexplained acquisition of wealth by an 
impecunious person at or about the time of a theft which he had an opportunity to 
commit, is competent evidence of guilt and will support conviction.”  United 
States v. Chaney, 446 F.2d 571, 575 (3d Cir. 1971).     
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will find that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to give 
McDade’s proposed instruction.  
Conclusion 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s decisions on 
all grounds.  
 
